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Abstract. We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing 
their intentions, agreeing or opposing their views and so on. These conceptual acts have phenomenological 
as well as formal richness. This paper attempts to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and 
formal approaches to conceptualization by claiming that we need to shift from the usual dichotomies of 
cognitive science and epistemology such as the formal/empirical and the rationalist/empiricist divides– to a 
view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of ‘valid cognition’. 
Methodologically, our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; ontologically, 
it is an attempt at marrying the phenomenal and the formal.  
1. Introduction: Indian Cognitivism.  We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; 
we are always judging others, guessing their intentions, agreeing or opposing their views and so 
on. These conceptual acts have both phenomenological as well as formal richness. On the 
phenomenal side, there is an experiential quality to judging, agreeing and denying of a “center-
surround” nature, i.e., a core phenomenal feeling of what it is like to judge, agree and deny 
surrounded by the emotional residue of judging, agreeing and denying. On the formal side, 
research in cognitive science has uncovered a complex computational structure behind ordinary 
thinking and reasoning (Kahneman, Slovic et al. 1982; Holyoak and Morrison 2005; Johnson-
Laird 2006; Tenenbaum, Griffiths et al. 2006). Partly because research into the computational 
complexities of conceptualization has yielded so many unexpected insights, research in cognitive 
science has highlighted the formal side of conceptualization to the detriment of the phenomenal. 
Cognitive scientists ask why children are so easily able to generalize from one instance of seeing 
a dog to other instances of seeing a dog (as a dog). They have shown almost no interest in asking 
what it is like for a child to generalize from seeing one dog as a dog to seeing other dogs as dogs. 
This paper attempts to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and formal approaches to 
conceptualization by making the radical claim that in order to integrate phenomenality and 
formality, we need to shift from the usual dichotomies– formal/empirical, rationalist/empiricist – 
to a view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of ‘valid cognition’. 
Methodologically, our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; 
ontologically, it is an attempt at marrying the phenomenal and the formal.  
Concepts have been a central topic throughout the history of investigation into mental 
phenomena. In the west the nature and origin of concepts and conceptual structure has been 
intensely debated ever since Plato (speaking through the mouth of Socrates) declared that 
concepts like JUSTICE cannot be learnt through sensory experience and must inhere in the soul. 
Philosophers both East and West have debated the key issues related to concepts such as the 
nature of meaning, the relation between language and thought, the relation between cognition 
and perception. These philosophical arguments been greatly augmented by the application of 
experimental and theoretical tools. Without the logical and mathematical tools developed by 
Frege, Russell and others, we would still be in a fog over how logical relations can be computed 
in a physical system (though deep puzzles still remain, especially about the ability of 
computational systems to carry meaning). Similarly, without Eleanor Rosch’s work on 
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categorization (Mervis and Rosch 1981) we would be stuck with classical categories. Even more 
importantly, these computational and empirical investigations greatly expanded our 
understanding of the scope, nature and complexity of conceptual structure. Three discoveries 
stand out from this period of theorizing about the mind: 
(1) Conceptual Structure is complex. Classical philosophers greatly underestimated the 
complexity of structure underlying even the simplest of conceptual phenomena. Consider the 
following pair of statements: 
1. They have a Bose system in their house 
2. There is a snake in the house! 
The interaction between speaker intention, the semantics of IN and our common sense 
understanding of the world is such that we conceptualize the two statements quite differently. 
How we do it has become a matter of great interest. 
(2) Conceptual Structure is automatic and unconscious. Like perception and language, most of 
conceptual processing is below the radar screen; it happens automatically and without any 
conscious input or interference. Once again, if we take the two statements in (a) above as 
indicators, we effortlessly combine the words in the sentence along with our encyclopedic 
knowledge of the world into an understanding of the speakers intentions, all of which happens 
unconsciously. 
(3) Conceptual Structure is Pervasive.  A child picks up a cup from a table and immediately 
knows that the cup is no longer on the table. She also knows (even if she doesn’t always obey the 
rule) that if the cup is tilted, the water will spill out. These are ways of acting in the world, and 
yet they are also conceptual, in that these acts can be evaluated as being right or wrong. 
Similarly, a driver approaches a red light at night and if it is Bangalore he proceeds without 
stopping while if it is Stockholm he stops and waits until it turns green. In both of the above 
cases, we see conceptualization reaching outwards via the senses and upwards towards social 
norms and rules of behavior. 
The first two of these maxims has a methodological consequence: if you want to study 
the mind, do not rely too much on introspective reports or purely philosophical formulations. The 
move away from introspection and philosophical speculation in the study of the mind is now 
universally accepted in the mind sciences and even to some extent in the philosophy of mind. 
The ubiquity of conceptualization is more controversial and has invited two very differing 
responses: one from the rationalist camp, which denies any genuine similarity between 
seemingly conceptual phenomena across mental faculties and the empiricist response, which says 
that we need to have a ‘cognitive commitment’ (Evans and Green 2006) towards theories that cut 
across mental faculties. While we believe in the cognitive commitment, we also believe that the 
empiricists have not adequately addressed their rationalist critics; and that once those critiques 
are taken seriously, we have to abandon the rationalist-empiricist axis altogether.  Our claim is 
that conceptualization can usefully be seen through the Indian philosophical notion of ‘valid 
cognition,’ which plays a central role in all theories of Indian epistemology. We claim that a 
theory of conceptualization based on valid cognitions is geared towards satisfying the cognitive 
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commitment, since it naturally cuts across mental faculties. Further, a theory of 
conceptualization based on valid cognitions is phenomenologically rich - it is not biased in favor 
of formal models. While Indian philosophy has many competing accounts of valid cognitions, all 
of them have the advantage of being experiential and inferential at the same time. Since valid 
cognition-based accounts package inferential and experiential features into a coherent whole, 
they point to an expanded role of phenomenology in the cognitive sciences, a role that goes well 
beyond the usual topics of perception and action into relatively less explored territories of 
conceptualization and reasoning.   
In our Indian philosophical approach, there is no intrinsic need to think that we have to 
choose between two different aetiologies for conceptualization, namely innate mappings on to 
formal truths or representations of environmental input; in short between nativism and 
empiricism. Instead, we study a situation where mappings between reasoning structures depend 
on intrinsic features of those structures; yet, those mappings exist only because of the 
embeddedness of the subject in her environment. For the first reason, this is not psychologism - 
the contingent tying of systematic reasoning to the vagaries of the subject's environmentally-
affected states. The second reason shows why humans work in a way impossible for computers 
as we currently understand them. Looking in particular at what some Indian philosophers -the 
Advaitins- argue is an independent instrument for attaining knowledge, – arthāpatti or 
‘postulation’ as it is normally translated – we seek to demonstrate the quite general claim that 
Indian approaches to concepts and knowledge is ‘cognitivist’. The goal of this paper then is 
twofold: 
(a) Recontextualize the debate about nature of conceptualization using Arthāpatti as a case 
study. 
(b) Expand the scope of phenomenological inquiry in the cognitive sciences by stressing the 
experiential basis of valid cognitions.  
Our desire to situate theories of conceptualization in the framework of valid cognitions is 
not a purely theoretical exercise; we believe that the divorce between the formal and the 
phenomenal has led to flawed account of conceptualization that have deleterious consequences 
for cognitive science, AI and any other field where formal methods have dominated the study of 
embedded systems. We believe that there are significant elements of Indian philosophy that can 
contribute to a cognitive theory of conceptualization, i.e., the manner in which concepts are 
entertained by individual subjects. Indian philosophers were well aware of the distinction 
between - what we would now call - psychological and abstract accounts of concepts. Classical 
Indian debates generally tended to use lexical concepts as examples, although the atomicity and 
construction of concepts was as much an issue there as in contemporary times. Similarly, while 
there was a broad debate between taking concepts to be abstracta (the Nyāya school) and as 
mental particulars (most Buddhists schools), with intermediate positions, none of the main 
positions, including Nyāya, denies that the entertainment of concepts - conceptualization - e.g., 
in specific concept-deploying perceptions (savikalpika pratyaka) - involves cognitions. We 
hope to remain neutral on the ontology of concepts, focusing instead on the key point that 
‘conceptualization’, namely, specific instances of entertaining concepts, is cognitive - and by 
‘cognitive’, we mean occurring in specific episodes of that central term of art in India 
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philosophy, jñāna, translated as ‘cognition’. For sake of brevity, we have narrowed our 
presentation of Indian philosophical ideas to one particular school, Advaita, although we use 
arguments from another school, Nyaya, since Advaita and many other schools accept much of 
the general theory of cognition originating in the Nyaya school. Before we turn to the Indian 
notion of cognition and its relationship to concepts, let us look at a brief sketch of the problems 
with concepts in contemporary cognitive scientific discussions. 
 
 2. Between Form and Experience. Most of us are used to walking to a table, picking up a cup 
of tea and then drinking the tea at leisure. Without any explicit effort, we know that once we pick 
up the cup of tea, it is no longer on the table and that when we drink the tea, it is no longer in the 
cup. At the other end of the spectrum, we know, equally effortlessly, that a cup is a kitchen 
utensil and kitchen utensils are home furnishings. The first kind of effortless thought is about the 
concrete structure of the world, while the second kind of effortless thought is about abstract 
concepts and their relationship. We are equally good at both, but it has proven almost impossible 
to design computer systems that have effortless common sense. To the extent scientists and 
engineers have managed to replicate common sense in computational models, they have had to 
build massively complex systems. The standard explanation is that human behavior and 
experience are deceptively simple, that ordinary activity is grounded in the dynamics of billions 
of neurons acting in concert. There is surely something right about behavior emerging from 
large, complex networks but one also wonders whether the emphasis on complexity stems from a 
metaphysical rather than a mechanical problem. What if our difficulty in engineering computers 
that behave like humans has more to do with unstated philosophical assumptions about the 
relationship between the body, self and world?  
Consider the English preposition ON. Cognitive scientists believe that the meaning of 
ON is stored in the mind of every English speaker. However each time ON is used (for example, 
in the sentence “The cup is ON the table”) it refers to a particular cup’s relationship with a 
particular table, both of which are out in the world. There are deep differences between the 
structure of the semantics of ON and the structure of the entities in the world referred to by ON. 
ON is abstract and schematic, in that ON can be used in an infinite variety of situations 
(cups on table, tables on carpets, carpets on floors etc), while the world is particular and fully 
formed (each cup and table has a particular shape and size and location). Further, the semantics 
of ON is highly sensitive to context. Consider the three statements below: 
The pot is on the floor.  
The dancer is on the floor. 
The drunk is on the floor. 
The meaning of ON in these three cases is rather different: in the first, it is about the 
location of the pot; in the second it is about a dancer who was somewhere else appearing on the 
stage, and in the third, it is a description of a person’s state. These are clearly related notions of 
ON, but the dominant theories of conceptualization in the cognitive sciences cannot model the 
context sensitivity of conceptualization, while maintaining the compositional structure of our 
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cognitions. Rationalist theories are good at modeling compositionality, while empiricist theories 
handle context sensitivity better, but no theory seems to combine the two into one framework. 
We briefly summarize the shortcomings of some of the major theories of conceptualization 
below and point out their struggle with the rationalist-empiricist axis.  
2A. Concepts as Definitions. Perhaps the oldest theory of conceptualization is that the meaning 
of a concept is given by necessary and sufficient conditions. For example, we could define the 
concept BACHELOR as “unmarried man”. Unfortunately, outside mathematics and certain areas 
of science, definitions don’t work. Is the Pope a bachelor? Perhaps we could solve the problem 
by redefining BACHELOR as “a man who remains unmarried despite the social license to 
marry.” Then what about the Medieval Popes, like the Borgias, whose children inherited their 
property? The definitional account runs quickly into three insuperable problems:  
-Necessary and sufficient conditions are hard to find. 
-Concepts have prototypical and not so prototypical examples, while definitions do not 
distinguish between one exemplar of a concept and another. For example, a penguin seems less 
prototypical of the concept BIRD than a sparrow. Why? 
-Definitions use concepts that themselves require definitions; if a bachelor is an unmarried man, 
what does ‘unmarried’ mean? How do we avoid infinite regress? 
2B. Concepts as Prototypes. The definitional theory of concepts was much influenced by 
mathematical and scientific concepts. However, most ordinary human concepts are used for day-
to-day categorization; acts that happen automatically and without any conscious deliberation. An 
early hominid would have needed to classify an animal as predator or prey very quickly. A snap 
categorization is in order to tell the motor system to hunt or to flee.  Prototypes allow us to 
classify a stimulus quickly and to convey the results of that classification to the motor system. 
Research by Eleanor Rosch and others (Mervis and Rosch 1981) argues for a basic level of 
categorization where processing and categorization happens automatically and quickly, faster 
than at any other level. Unfortunately, prototype theory does not handle compositionality well. 
Consider the concepts PET, FISH and PETFISH. As concepts, PET and FISH clearly combine to 
give PETFISH. In what way is a prototype for PETFISH a combination of prototypes for PET 
and FISH? 
2C. Concepts as Theories. Perhaps, concepts are proto-theories that ‘explain’ the data, i.e., the 
objects represented by that concept (Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). As more data arrives, 
conceptual change occurs. A child might start with thinking that any transparent drinkable liquid 
is water, later figure out that gin and water are different substances and eventually learn that 
water is individuated by the chemical H2O. There are two problems with the theory-theory: 
It does not handle metaphorical uses of a concept, which are quite common. For example, how 
can the theory-theory explain “my soup is too watery?” 
Theories are too ‘stable’ to handle context sensitivity. Suppose you are in the middle of the 
desert and you notice a pool of dark, brackish liquid. That liquid will not qualify as water if you 
are thirsty, but is perfectly fine if you need something to hose off the dirt caked on your car.  
2D. Embodied Conceptualization. Cognitive linguists have tried the hardest to reconcile the 
formal and the experiential aspects of cognition; consequently, our presentation of the 
shortcomings of the embodied approach to conceptualization is the most detailed of the four 
theories of conceptualization we consider. Metaphor theorists like to point out that our 
conceptualization of abstract concepts often comes from concrete sources such as space, time, 
and the structure of the body – for example, note that we refer to political leaders as “heads of 
state”. Take spatial concepts for example. As cognitive linguists have shown, space is an 
important source of semantic intuitions (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Furthermore, spatial 
concepts have been formalized in many ways in modern mathematics. The particular manner in 
which linguistic concepts are schematic can often be described by simple topological relations 

























object (usually larger and more static) such as containment (encoded by IN), contact (encoded by 
ON), and encirclement (encoded by AROUND). Figure 1 above shows some of the topological 
relations encoded by spatial prepositions in English. Since these prepositions make reference to 
objects whose relationship with each other is geometric, it is natural to assume that any 
mathematical theory that formalizes the relationship between topology and geometry will have 
something to say about the relationship between spatial concepts and their objects. Of course, not 
all concepts are spatial, but as research in cognitive linguistics has demonstrated, spatial 
representations inform our conceptualization of non-spatial domains such as politics (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999). Nevertheless, while embodiment oriented explanations of concept representation 











The first problem with the embodied view of the mind is that the body is not a well 
defined object. If, by body, you mean the surface skin, musculature, skeleton and the organs (i.e., 
the visible external and internal body) then it is hard to see how that notion of body constitutes 
some of the essential features of conceptualization – like the fact that concepts are abstract. In 
what way is justice embodied in the muscles? Principles like fairness or equality might be 
transparently present in our experience, but how are they in our body? An embodied cognitivist 
might respond that our experience is conditioned by the kinds of bodies we have, that our notions 
of justice are influenced by the fact that we experience other people having bodies similar to ours 
and therefore needs and rights similar to ours. However, there is a slip betwixt cup and lip. How 
do we go from other people having bodies similar to ours to having rights similar to ours? 
Having a similar body licenses an inference about similarity of rights but only if we presuppose 
the existence of a being enjoying those rights. After all, we do not feel any need to grant 
manikins rights.  
This brings us to the second objection to embodied cognitivism, which is, when do we 
make projections from embodied experience and when do we not? Take a typical example, one 
often used in illustrations of embodiment in conceptualization; the metaphor that LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY. It is true that we use that metaphor all the time, but we also know where to stop 
making the analogy. You might take a journey from Bangalore by train, get off at Madikeri, take 
a taxi and go to your hotel. Similarly, you might be in love and break up after all while. But you 
do not take a taxi and go to a hotel or anything that might be an analogical counterpart in the 
LOVE frame. How do you know when to stop making the analogy? Where does that innate sense 
that metaphors only go so far come from?  
Social norms about what counts as an appropriate analogy clearly have a place here; 
children are unceasingly learning what kind of match matters socially:  With collections, the 
child discovers that to project the count-matching idea of ‘size’ onto collections, with priority 
over other ideas, is successful in two important senses.  First, it is socially rewarded by adults.  
Second, it gives manipulative power over collections, physically and socially.  You can fit the 
stones into a count-matched set of holes, or trade them for a matched set of coins.  The 
phenomenology of counting includes the phenomena of matching by various criteria such as 
solidity, precision and rightness. However, learning to match using socially relevant criteria is 
not enough. Is it logically possible for such criteria to make an impact, without a cognitive 
principle able to recognize and apply abstract criteria, depending on the context?  In a corporate 
setting, we must be able to ignore body size when figuring out the social hierarchy (your boss 
might be short and skinny. In a vote — where numbers dominate, by definition — do we count 
noses, or share certificates?  The schemata (for objects or social relationships) signify less than 
the process of forming them, and the moment-to-moment choice among them.  In the absence of 
a universally valid set of abstractions for all problems, there must be a gamut of ways to cognize.  
To base a foundational theory on only one such way – the embodied inputs - is an error. 
Grounded cognition theories (Barsalou, Kyle Simmons et al. 2003; Barsalou 2008) recognize 
that concepts can be grounded in modal (but non-bodily) representations via the means of 
simulation. These theories differ from classical theories primarily in emphasizing that the 
representations underlying human conceptual systems are not amodal as claimed by the classical 
theorists. Like us, grounded cognition theorists blur the rationalist-empiricist divide by accepting 
a genetic basis for seemingly empiricist capacities like mental imagery and simulation. Our 
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approach is compatible with grounded cognition, though we are agnostic as to whether concepts 
are represented in modal or amodal form. Since our account of conceptualization is at the level 
of human competence (see section 5), we do not make claims about the underlying 
representations (see Marr (1982) for an account of the difference between the competence level 
and the representational level of explanation). For example, we are open to the possibility that 
different modal representations of space are constrained by the same abstract geometric 
principles as it is that our notions of geometry come from the integration of spatial 
representations across modes.    
Embodiment - and groundedness in general- are a part of the human (animal) condition 
but not the whole of it. The problem with all the four accounts of conceptualization summarized 
in this section is that they are constantly grappling with the rationalist-empiricist axis, one pole 
of which denies experience and the other which denies any innate structure. Unfortunately, 
conceptualization has both! The key fact needing explanation is the capacity of an organism to 
respond appropriately to environmental stimuli without being determined by those stimuli. 
Appropriate responses require that organisms be embedded, while the creativity of the response 
requires that the mapping from input to output depend on structures internal to the organism. 
Paradoxically, what seems strictly internal to the organism is deeply embedded in the world. This 
is where Indian theories of conceptualization based on valid cognitions might be helpful to 
modern cognitive science. As we will see in the next section, the logical structure and the 
embodied structure of being human are enfolded within our experience. This enfolding can be 
analyzed using the techniques of Indian reasoning. In section 4, we will look at arthāpatti, which 
is a technique of reasoning, or an instrument for attaining knowledge, according to some Indian 
schools. As organisms that occupy space and place, we know that we do not occupy two places 
at one time. ‘Postulation’ (arthāpatti) helps us understand how ‘X not being in place p’ (in some 
way) necessarily implies that ‘X is in place q’ without it being a formal consequence of the 
axiomatization of space. Indian philosophy can help us address an important question in the 
study of conceptualization: how can we study conceptual structure without reducing 
conceptualization to ‘pure formalization’ or to ‘pure embodiment?’ The notion of ‘valid 
cognition’, within which the analysis of postulation is located, is innocent of the knowledge of 
the formal-empirical axis. It thereby offers a different way of going about looking at how 
concepts work. In the next section, we elucidate the basic structure of valid cognition and then 
show how it can be used to negotiate around the axis between between rationalism and 
empiricism.  
3. Valid Cognitions. In order to get at the way in which ‘valid cognition’ (pramā) combines 
epistemological and phenomenological features, let us first look at some broad features of the 
concept of cognition (jñāna or, less commonly, dhī). To start with, we will look at the 
description of cognition by the school of Nyāya, because its general analysis is widely accepted 
by most of the other Indian schools. This in turn will lead us to the next section, on a particular 
means of securing knowledge, according to the Advaitins, in which the deployment of concepts 
is likewise seen to involve both formal and empirical elements.  
According to the Nyāya school, a cognition is something that a subject-self (ātman) 
possesses, and is intentional, in that it is always ‘with object’ (saviayaka); such that  cognitions 
can be distinguished by their taking different things (object-as-thing (viśea)) as their objects 
9 
 
(object-as-that-which-is-related-to (artha)(Dravid 1996; chapter 4, verse 4). In its developed 
form, Nyāya even holds that intentionality is a uniquely constitutive feature 
(svarūpasabandha) of cognition – describing consciousness quite generally in terms of its 
capacity to take other things as object (parata-prakāśa, other-illuminating) (Ram-Prasad 
2007). 
According to the Naiyāyika, fresh cognitions – as opposed to memory – are divided into 
two categories, valid (pramā) and invalid (apramā). A valid cognition is a non-accidentally true 
cognition, generated through a prescribed epistemic instrument. The epistemic instruments are 
our sense organs and different forms of reasoning. Perception is what we directly have through 
our sense organs. One particular form of inference (called anumāna) is another dominant 
instrument for gaining knowledge: we may form a hypothesis of the form, ‘all the cases of x are 
cases of y’ (e.g., ‘all the cases of being cordate are cases of being renate’), on the basis of 
perceptual experience. Such a ‘hypothetical’ cognition is the cognition of pervasion (vyāpti) of 
the state-of-being-cordate by the state-of-being-renate. When we combine this with a perceptual 
cognition, ‘this is a case of x’, we get another cognition, i.e., ‘this is a case of y’ (e.g., when we 
find a cordate, we infer that it is renate too). Such a cognition is hypothetico-deductive (anumiti) 
and what we mean by the term ‘inference’ in this article is the hypothetico-deductive inference 
that is formed in the aforementioned manner.  Then, according to the Naiyāyikas and other 
schools, there is testimony (śabda) as another instrument for gaining knowledge. When a person 
of trust (their trustworthiness itself determined criterially), who knows that, ‘a is b’, tells us that, 
‘a is b’, we cognize that a has the property of being b. This testimonial cognition is actually a 
combination of two cognitions rooted in experience; the cognition of the semantic relationship 
between words and meanings and the auditory cognition of the sentence, ‘a is b’. A cognition is 
valid when it is true and is caused by epistemic instruments.  
 Doubt, illusion and error are standard examples of invalid cognitions. We need not go 
into the elaboration within the Nyāya theory of the ways in which cognitions are invalid; suffice 
it to say that the general category consists in cognitions which somehow deviate from things as 
they are and usually result in judgements that are false. Nyāya is concerned primarily with the 
epistemological implications of cognition, and the tradition has not paid much attention to the 
nature of cognitions that are not about in/validity. They draw upon a commonsense intuition that 
some sorts of cognitive states are constitutively intentional, in occurring because of an objective 
trigger: ‘perceiving, inferring, knowing, doubting, wondering, guessing, remembering, 
dreaming’, in Matilal’s rendering of the standard Nyāya list (Matilal 1968). In effect, this 
approach to cognition is remarkably like a ‘centre-surround’ view, in that the core is made up of 
cognitions (strictly speaking) that are primarily related to objects and have intentional content, 
surrounded by cognitions (broadly speaking) that are secondarily related to objects and are states 
that the subject undergoes without primary intentionality. 
Comparative philosophy has grappled with how alien this focus on human experience 
even at the heart of epistemology in India must seem to the 20th century Western analytic 
tradition. The centrality of cognitions to epistemology in Indian philosophy is crucial to our 
argument. It is true that from the perspective of the anti-psychologism of Frege and Husserl, 
Indian discussions of reasoning can seem ‘psychologistic’. But at least since the mid-20th 
century, there have been specific concerns about this form of anti-psychologism within Western 
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philosophical traditions themselves (Kusch). One important point is that Husserl’s anti-
psychologism, at any rate, turned on an absolute conception of logical truths as ideal (with the 
concomitant fear that looking at the logic of human reasoning will condemn such study to the 
relativism of people’s individual psychologies). But the sciences themselves are about the ‘real 
rather than the ideal’ (Naess 1954), and so logic concerns the factual in a way that Husserl’s anti-
psychologism cannot see. Even more relevant to the modern Indian concern about the problem 
‘psychologism’ causes for Indian theories of valid cognition is the central argument of Jack 
Meiland’s (1976) defense of Husserl’s original opponent, Benno Erdmann. (It is by no means 
necessary to think that Erdmann’s specific views are comparable to Indian theories.) The anti-
psychological argument is that if logic is about mental states, judgments and other psychological 
entities, then they would have content, whereas logical laws should have no such real content. 
This seems to apply to Indian theories of valid cognition. Meiland’s response is that even if the 
laws of logic are not about actual human reasoning (and the psychology in which it is 
embedded), they are still true for human beings precisely because of their psychology; to put it 
another way, the laws of logic are part of human competence (Chomsky 1965). The law of non-
contradiction is not stated just with reference to human beings; but ‘it is true for human beings 
by virtue of their nature’ (Meiland 1976). It is, therefore, not particularly necessary to worry 
about Indian theories of valid cognition being ‘psychologistic’. 
In fact, as the first section indicates, contemporary mind sciences have struggled with the 
consequences of taking human reality to turn on the polarity between the formal/objective and 
the empirical/subjective. Problems in the understanding of cognition are as often created as they 
are solved by searching for purely formal features of reasoning and then trying to apply them to 
environmental inputs. As has been amply recognized in recent decades, this split between the 
contingent empirical input from the environment and the formal structures of logical reasoning 
makes for an effective third-personal account of human cognition, but leaves out the 
phenomenology of the first-person perspective. Apart from issues in the study of consciousness, 
this lacuna has also created problems in the programme of capturing human reasoning 
computationally. Our claim is that, by treating cognitions as the focus of the analysis of actual 
human reasoning – cognition, seen as the phenomenology of structured human embeddedness in 
its environment – Indian philosophy offers a more sustainable unit of analysis. 
The relevant unit here is the notion of a valid cognition. A valid cognition is one which is 
both true by virtue of some mapping of reality, and attained through evidentially sound 
procedures in accordance with the proper function of epistemic instruments. How truth is 
secured, what those procedures are, how their functioning is monitored, by whom or what, and in 
what the attainment of validity consists are all matters of debate. But the point to note here is that 
the concept of a valid cognition is a combination of what are three different issues in western 
thought: truth (satya), as a mapping of some feature of reality; valid cognition (pramā), as some 
virtuous quality regarding that reality, possessed by a subject; and phenomenality (prakāśa), as 
something that the subject undergoes (i.e., as something it is like for the subject). A valid 
cognition therefore is neither formal nor empirical. It is not formal, in that its content is specific 
to the subject, even if a description of that content can function as a template for other 
indexically-adjusted contentful subjective states. It is embedded in the phenomenological 
specifity of the subject. But it is not empirical as such in non-perceptual cases. As our analysis of 
a class of conceptual mappings to epistemologically consistent conclusions – the mode of 
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gaining knowledge called arthāpatti or postulation – will show, valid cognitions, even when they 
are phenomenological by definition, can also derive their epistemic status from within the mental 
space of the subject and not from environmental inputs. 
In this essay, what we want to consider is how, regardless of how the Indian thinkers 
anatomize valid cognitions, these valid cognitions are both phenomenological and 
epistemological. In particular, we want to look at how certain valid cognitions are held to attain 
validity through the deployment of conceptual reasoning. For it is here that the notion that 
concepts can be non-empirical, non-formal and phenomenal is explored; a notion that sounds 
impossibly hybrid from the conventional western analytic viewpoint, but might offer a plausible 
way forward for contemporary challenges recognized in the mind sciences. We want to look at a 
particular Advaitic instrument called arthāpatti or postulation which brings out clearly how 
conceptuality and phenomenality are two sides of the same thing.  
4. Postulation. The Advaita school of classical Indian thought claims that there is a specific, 
independent epistemic instrument called arthāpatti, commonly translated as ‘postulation’. We 
are not here concerned with the debate with the Nyaya school as to whether postulation is a 
distinct epistemological mode separate from anumāna, commonly translated as a specific type of 
‘inference’. Anumāna is the specific mode of reasoning wherein, based on prior knowledge of 
correlations – like ‘where there is smoke, there is fire’, the perception of smoke on the mountain 
leads to the hypothetico-deductive conclusion, ‘there is fire on the mountain’. In order to indicate 
this specific and limited idea of inference in classical Indian thought, we will use the italics 
inference in this essay. We believe that our general arguments for the phenomenological nature 
of conceptual activity, and the structuring of concepts through the human embeddedness in the 
world can work with an analysis of anumāna as well (if Nyaya is right that arthāpatti is actually 
a form of anumāna). However, we find the Advaitic notion of arthāpatti (postulation) 
particularly helpful and clear in helping us demonstrate our argument; and so we will continue to 
focus on it without prejudice to the debate on whether postulation can be re-read as a particular 
form of inference.  Note, however, that arthāpatti is also inference in the general sense but the 
contrast is with inference in the specific sense of anumāna. Postulation covers conceptualizations 
common in ordinary discourse. Consider reasoning in the form of these statements: 
1. Devadatta is not at home.  
2. He must be somewhere else. 
Human beings make this kind of statements all the time; they are part of the automatic 
bookkeeping we do with the furniture of the human world. These automatic conceptual leaps are 
in some sense the counterpart of metaphors in the domain of reasoning. Just as in the process of 
understanding we make a cognitive mapping from love as an emotion to love as a journey, we 
also make cognitive mappings from one conceptualization about the state of the world to another 
conceptualization about the state of the world that is not directly connected with the first.  
At first glance, arthāpatti resembles abduction (Peirce 1931; Lipton 2000). To see why 
this is not so, let us first look at how induction and abduction differ in direction, before going on 




(a) All balls in this particular random sample are red; all balls in this particular random sample 
are taken from this urn; therefore, all balls in this urn are red. 
 
(b) All balls in this urn are red; all balls in this particular random sample are red; therefore, all 
balls in this particular random sample are taken from this urn.  
 
(a) is an inductive reasoning while (b) is abductive. In the Indian framework both can be 
translated into the language of inference (anumiti). The schematic representation of an inference 
is: z is a case of y, since z is a case of x; and this is based on the pervasion (between x and y) 
which should be stated as: any case of x is a case of y. Now the above inductive reasoning will 
definitely fit into the schematic representation of the statement of pervasion. The Indian version 
of the above inductive inference would look like the following:  
 
(a’) Any case of ‘(a ball’s) being a member of a particular population from which a random 
sample has been drawn’ is a case of ‘being red’.2 
 
(a’) has been rightly hypothesized because (i) each ball of the random sample is red, and 
(ii) each has been taken from that particular population. (i) and (ii) are ‘observational sentences’ 
that serve as the empirical basis for (a’). The Indian logician would say that one can validly 
conclude (a’) since one has seen that each ball randomly taken from the urn is red (sahacāra-
darśana), and no ball taken from the urn is non-red (vyabhicāra-adarśana). (a’) is a statement of 
pervasion for the Indian logician. Inductive generalization takes place thus. Any hypothesization 
of pervasion must have some observational ground that has been supported by real data. Now the 
abductive inference (b) too can be translated into the Indian inferential language. It is the 
following: 
 
(b’) This is a case of ‘drawing a random sample only from a particular population’, since it is a 
case of ‘having only red balls both in the random sample and in the particular population’.  
 
Here too a pervasion is involved, and it is stated in the following proposition: 
 
 
2 For the Indian logician, the relation of pervasion holds between two properties (dharma). For example, they would 
say that ‘cordate-ness  pervades renate-ness’  in order to express the following meaning: ‘any case of being a renate 
is a case of being a cordate’, or simply ‘all renates are cordates’. This ‘case of’ talk is the closest to the Sanskrit 
property-based formulation.    
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(b’’)  Any case of ‘having only red balls both in a random sample and in a particular population’ 
is a case of ‘drawing the random sample from the particular population’. 
 
(b’’)  has an observational basis. Normally abduction or inference to the best explanation 
is understood thus: If E is an inference to the best explanation of a set of events O according to a 
theory T, then (i) O must be a consequence of E according to T, and (ii) T and E must be 
consistent. Here T is nothing but an observation-based hypothesis that is our statement of 
pervasion. We may see how this is different from postulation. Here is a case of postulation: A 
case of not-being-here-while-existing must be a case of being-somewhere-else; otherwise it is 
inexplicable. But we cannot say that: A case of ‘having only red balls both in a random sample 
and in a particular population’ must be a case of ‘drawing the random sample from the particular 
population’, otherwise it is inexplicable. Suppose unknown to us, there are two urns each of 
which has a billion red balls, and we are aware of the existence of the first one only while the 
random sample is actually drawn from the second urn. This case does not involve inconsistency; 
hence the question of ‘inconsistency otherwise’ does not even arise here. The apprehension of 
pervasion (vyāptigraha) happens through inductive reasoning while abductive inference is a full-
fledged inference in the sense of anumāna. Pervasion is part of the body of an inference. 
Inference understood in the specific sense of anumāna and arthāpatti (postulation) are 
epistemologically different since the former is preceded by observation and the latter takes place 
through the process of ‘inexplicability otherwise’ without depending on observation – a process 
that is crucial to our argument about the phenomenological aspect of conceptualization.  
The sense of ‘inexplicability’ is an intuition. We intuitively know which propositions are 
consistent and which ones are not. We cannot explain why we cannot accept the following 
proposition: Something is both red and green. We can just say that it is not explicable. The idea 
of explicability is so basic that other epistemic ideas are defined in terms of it.   First of all, 
postulation is not perception; for it does not involve any sensual representation of any object, i.e., 
nothing ‘appears’ in a postulation, whereas a pot appears in the perceptual cognition about that 
pot. Postulation is not inference; for inference is an epistemic method that operates on the basis 
of the experience of the coexistence of two entities, and postulation is not based on any 
observation of coexistence of any sort. On the basis of observation (if not directly our own, then 
through authoritative testimony – which is another instrument to secure valid cognition) we form 
a hypothesis, ‘all cases of x are cases of y’, and come across a case of x. Then we may 
inferentially conclude that, ‘this is a case of y’. Prior to inferring fire from smoke we must 
observe that any locus of smoke is a locus of fire. And this observation of the coexistence is 
always partial. We cannot see all the instances of smoke; for if we see all of those to have fire, 
then there would be no room for inference. Our cognition that any locus of smoke is a locus of 
fire would be perceptual in that case. This partial observation is always threatened by an 
‘inductive leap’. But postulation does not tolerate anything partial. Even an incorrect (but doubt-
free) postulation gives us a feeling that it is complete, i.e., nothing else is to be known about it, 
whereas inference always leaves us with the feeling that some empirical data could invalidate it. 
We call this completeness ‘procedural closure’, since, as an epistemic process, postulation is 
complete in itself and allows no further procedure once the conclusion has been reached.  
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A rationalist could argue that postulation is analytic; that going from Devadatta-is-not-
here to Devadatta-is-somewhere-else is like going from Fido-is-a-dog to Fido-is-an-animal. But 
postulation is non-analytic since the meaning of ‘Devadatta is somewhere else’ is not in any way 
contained in the meaning of ‘Devadatta is not at home’. Instead, the concept of not-at-home is 
‘cognitively mapped’ onto the concept of being-somewhere-else. The cognitive mapping 
between concepts is constitutive of the epistemic life of a human being, and shared by all human 
epistemic systems. Postulation is the utilization of these mappings. The Advaitins actually draw 
on an earlier version of the idea, from the Mīmāsā school: according to the Mīmāmsaka Śabara 
(Chinnaswami Shastri 1929), postulation happens when the perception of an entity is a particular 
situation (call it loosely a ‘scenario’) is inexplicable otherwise than through a conclusion. In 
order to get rid of the feeling of inexplicability in explaining it in any other way, another scenario 
is invoked. This assumption is postulation. Let us return to the stock example: from seeing that 
Devadatta, who is alive, is not at home, one postulates that Devadatta is somewhere else. This 
pattern is further elaborated as follows:  
Devadatta is alive. Without being out, it is not possible for Devadatta to be absent from home. So 
the text says: being-out is the only explanation for X’s absence at home when X is alive. The 
phrase ‘otherwise inexplicable’ means: if being-out is denied, X’s absence-at-home will be 
inexplicable. 
In cognitive science terms, postulation is an automatic ‘projection’ of an explanatory 
hypothesis on to the explanandum which is driven by a tacit understanding of the nature of the 
world we live in. A world where beings can vanish for a while and emerge back from the ether is 
not a world where postulation of the form, ‘X that exists and is not here must be somewhere else’ 
will work. The phenomenological structure of human epistemic systems would simply be 
constituted differently.  In this sense, postulation is both grounded in the particular world we live 
in and the bodies we inhabit; and yet at the same time, the reasoning sequences that come about 
through postulation are non-defeasible on the basis of perceptual inputs.  
 
5. A Cognitive View of Postulation. The Advaitic theory of postulation is best seen as a theory 
about human competence (Chomsky 1965), i.e, a theory that lays bare the abstract structure of 
the domain under investigation. Competence-based accounts have been important whenever we 
are faced with a licensing question, i.e., “what licenses the occurrence of phenomenon X?” Just 
as one can ask of the person studying concept learning in children “what licenses (in the child’s 
mind) the generalization of a concept from one instance to other instances?” we can also ask 
“what licenses a postulation from one cognitive state (Devadatta-is-not-at-home) to another 
(Devadatta-must-be-somewhere-else)?” as: 
 




While our account of postulation is a competence account, we are neutral about the 
underlying theory of concept possession; we are not committed to representational or any other 
account of concepts. For example, we are agnostic as to whether: 
• The transformation of ‘Devadatta is not here’ into ‘Devadatta is somewhere else’ is a 
computational transformation of internal representations with the contents ‘Devadatta is 
not here’ and ‘Devadatta is somewhere else’ respectively. 
• ‘Devadatta is not here’ and ‘Devadatta is somewhere else’ are metaphorical projections 
from our embodied experience of Devadatta.  
Our minimal assumption – consistent with the general ‘valid cognition’ framework - is: 
Conceptualizations such as ‘Devadatta is not here’ are systematically about the state of 
Devadatta not being there, i.e., that that the structure of the world has a conceptual correlate, and 
the correlate changes when the world changes. For example, if it turns out that the person who 
we thought was Devadatta was really Ramadatta, then the cognition ‘Devadatta is not here’ is 
replaced by ‘Ramadatta is not here.’ The conceptualization has to be true; our assumption is 
compatible with seeing a rope as a snake as long as the snake becomes a garland when the rope 
becomes a lasso. 
Note how the ‘otherwise inexplicability’ scenario automatically leads to non-defeasibility within 
the current conceptual repertoire of postulation; e.g., a child who believes in the tooth fairy is 
unlikely to use the presence (or absence) of teeth and presents to disbelieve in the existence of a 
tooth fairy. If perception could give rise to an explanation, then the phenomenon at hand would 
not be otherwise inexplicable. Inexplicability, for us, is a phenomenological rather than 
epistemological criterion. A child who concludes that her tooth was taken by the tooth fairy (and 
is certain that the tooth fairy will gift her something in return) is postulating an (otherwise 
inexplicable) explanation for her missing tooth. Conceptual change does occur, there is a 
moment of sad awakening when children realize that the tooth fairy was one of their parents, but 
conceptual change (Carey 2009) is not based on proximal evidence, it is change in the very 
axioms of the epistemic system. While Naiyayikas, agreeing with ‘theory-theorists’ (Gopnik and 
Meltzoff 1997) might argue that the shift in axioms (from the tooth fairy to doting mother as the 
underlying explanation for the missing tooth) is an example of inductive inference, Advaitins 
will disagree, saying that no amount of inference can justify the shift. Whether one agrees with 
the Advaitin or the Naiyayika, cognitive scientists who work on conceptual change will benefit 
from understanding the debate between the two.  
These feelings of certainty and inexplicability are constitutive of our experience of the 
world, or what is a better description, the world-in-cognition. As we conceive various aspects of 
the world, our conceptualizations come with various experiences; one second, it feels like we are 
certain about something, the next minute we are not so sure. These fleeting judgments are 
constitutive of our experience, as much as perception or action.  To use a gestalt analogy, 
conceptual judgments are the ground of experience, the figure of which might be a particular 
conceptualization such as ‘Devadatta is somewhere else’. It is this cognitive certainty (rather 
than veridicality) and inexplicability about the outcome of postulation that interests us, and we 
think is the central cognitive science question as well. Here, we are in line with the majority of 
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cognitive scientists, who think that experiential judgments are the core data for the field. For 
example, while a prescriptive grammarian might wag her finger at various uses of language 
(judging “it is me” instead of “it is I” as wrong), generative linguists use grammaticality 
judgments by the man on the street as the data for their theories of grammar. Similarly, we think 
that judgments of certainty and inexplicability should lie at the heart of a phenomenologically 
rich theory of conceptualization.  
Since postulation simultaneously exhibits deductive and phenomenological features, the 
argument that there is something like what it is to have the conceptualization ‘Devadatta is not 
here’ and ‘Devadatta is somewhere else’ makes postulation a striking and productive notion to 
explore within the broad cognitive scientific idea of the phenomenology of conceptualization. 
Phenomenologically, postulation is the means through which our embeddedness in the world is 
expressed in the experience of moving from one to another concept (from Devadatta-is-not-at-
home to Devadatta-is-somewhere-else). On the one hand, postulation is the means through which 
we experience ourselves as reasonably capable beings-in-the-world. On the other hand, the 
structure of postulation is encoded in the form of an automatic, mostly unconscious competence. 
Classical Indian approaches to cognition, and the Advaitic notion of postulation, render that 
distinction moot. In turn, the Indian approaches to cognition suggest a more phenomenologically 
grounded theory of conceptualization.  
6. The Phenomenology of Conceptualization. Conceptualization is one of the most heavily 
researched topics in the cognitive sciences. While there are many research programs that study 
aspects of conceptualization, from the origins and development of concepts (Carey 2009) to the 
structure of thinking and reasoning (Holyoak and Morrison 2005) there is almost no work in 
cognitive science on the phenomenology of conceptualization. There are many reasons for the 
absence of phenomenological investigations of conceptualization. First, studies of thinking have 
often concentrated on evaluating human reasoning relative to norms of reason. For example, 
much research has investigated ‘common mistakes’ of reasoning, such as our ability to calculate 
probabilities correctly (Johnson-Laird 2006). Similarly, influential studies (Kahneman, Slovic et 
al. 1982) have shown systemic biases in human reasoning away from a normative. Here, the 
important variable is the difference between actual behavior and the norm, not the felt quality of 
the actual behavior. 
Secondly, conceptualization is seen as an unconscious process, developing automatically 
in children and deployed without any conscious control. Here, the main questions are “How do 
children generalize a concept from one instance to other, novel instances? How do they learn to 
do so without any negative feedback?” The experiential quality of conceptualization is irrelevant 
when investigating these questions. Finally, scholars who might be inclined to look at the 
phenomenology of conceptualization – such as embodied cognitivists - have mostly concentrated 
on perception and action and have not paid much attention to conceptualization (Varela, 
Thompson et al. 1991; Noe 2004; Thompson 2007). Even cognitive linguists have not paid much 
attention to conceptual experience apart from the claim that conceptualization is somehow 
grounded in bodily experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Evans and Green 2006).  
But conceptualization is not just grounded in experience, it is a form of experience. 
Despite their aversion to incorporating experience in their theories of conceptualization, 
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cognitive scientists are well aware of the centrality of conceptual experience. Generative 
linguists base their theories of language on grammaticality judgments by native speakers. 
Grammaticality is an experiential judgment: part of what it is like to hear language (rather than 
noise or music) is that the sound stream is experienced as grammatical. Similarly, the use of 
metaphor has a different feel than the use of direct speech; suppose someone from a pre-modern 
culture asks: what is an airplane, we might answer “oh, it is a machine that flies like a bird.” The 
use of analogy here is an experientially salient act of comparison. We are mostly forgetful of 
conceptual experience because it is the ground of experience. Only when it becomes ‘figural’ are 
we reminded of its absence; just as three-year old infants stare longer at situations that violate 
causality or conservation of mass, we go about our daily lives unmindful of conceptual 
experience. Conceptualization, in the sense of evaluation of truth, value, acceptability etc is 
involved throughout our daily lives, when we are eating food, driving to work, saying your 
prayers, making phone calls, all of which are highly ritualized and strongly constrained, where 
most of the time things work as we expect them to. The world is “deeply regular”.   
It is these deep regularities of the world-in-cognition that allow us to conclude Devadatta 
is somewhere else when we find out he is not at home. Certainty and otherwise-inexplicablity are 
part of our experience of postulation; we feel certain about our conclusion that Devadatta is 
somewhere else and we are baffled if we do not find him in his usual hangouts, until we are told 
that he was hiding away in his bedroom, writing. Bafflement, certainty, inexplicability, curiosity; 
these are all part of what it feels like to think. These feelings lie at the intersection of the 
phenomenal and the cognitive. When we experience the world as ‘humming along’ we are 
unifying the functional and the phenomenal characteristics of postulation; it is this experience 
that tells us that we are postulating explanations for structures that are otherwise inexplicable. 
Otherwise, we would be experiencing bafflement or frustration. The cognitive-functional 
operations of our minds are coupled to the world via the means of experience. These feelings 
partly constitute our experience of the world-in-cognition, i.e., a world in which we act, mostly 
successfully, but sometimes erroneously. As adults, we tacitly assume that the world is 
manageable, that ordinary cognitive challenges can be addressed fluently, without any explicit 
effort, i.e., through a mechanism that must be like postulation. Of course, we are not always 
successful; a full inventory of the experience of conceptualization will surely reveal 
phenomenologically salient evaluations of the ways in which things fail. Nevertheless, arthāpatti 
encodes something central in our cognitive lives, the experience of fulfillment of our daily 
cognitive needs along with the functional apparatus that goes towards meeting those needs.  
There have been strands of thought in Western philosophy where it has been argued that 
phenomenality is not limited to sensations or emotions alone, but can also apply to more abstract 
entities like beliefs or thoughts in general. In the phenomenological tradition, Dan Zahavi has in 
recent years made the case that there should not be a division between intentionality (as in 
thoughts) and phenomenality, arguing that this goes back to Husserl (Zahavi 2004). Zahavi also 
rightly points to the development of this argument independently in analytic philosophy, most 
notably by Galen Strawson (1994), who has said that cognitive content has the qualitative 
character of experience. While we do not expect our position to be consistent with or endorsed 
by such philosophers, we want to say that a roughly similar position is found across classical 
Indian thought, in the focus on cognition (jñāna) as the unit of analysis. Furthermore, we explore 
the particular aspect of Indian thought wherein the deployment of concepts in cognition is both a 
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phenomenal and epistemological (and therefore intentional) process. The broad similarity 
between the general Indian approach and contemporary acknowledgement of the phenomenality 
of thought shows that there is sufficient mutual translatablity for cross-cultural conceptual 
analysis to be possible. At the same time, some of the methodological features of the Indian 
debates show that contemporary research on the issue can benefit from what is specific to those 
debates. The Indian theorists, by recognizing that conceptualization – as conceptual cognition 
(savikalpika pratyaka) – is something we undergo, have given us an opportunity to develop a 
qualitatively richer theory of mind and experience.  
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